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Process and Substance in Judicial Review in the United Kingdom and at 
Strasbourg: Proportionality, Subsidiarity, Complementarity? 
 
Roger Masterman

 
 
I: Introduction 
Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the United 
Kingdom – and indeed other member states – suggest an approach to the assessment 
of proportionality that takes into account the adequacy of administrative and 
legislative (and adjudicative
1
) process at the domestic level. On the basis of this 
approach, legislation and policy decisions which can demonstrate a firm evidential, as 
well as democratic, underpinning may be more likely to fall within a state’s margin of 
appreciation, and therefore would be more likely to be regarded by the Strasbourg 
court as being compliant with the Convention. National decisions adopted following 
‘extensive debate by the democratically elected representatives of the state’,2 which 
can be shown to be ‘the culmination of …detailed examination of the social, ethical 
and legal implications of developments’3 or which have proceeded following 
‘exacting and pertinent reviews, by both parliamentary and judicial bodies’4 – for 
instance – have been taken by the European Court of Human Rights to contribute to 
its assessment of compliance with the Convention standards.
5
 As a result, 
consideration of the depth and quality of the decision-making process at the national 
level will be weighed in the Court’s assessment of the proportionality of a challenged 
                                                 

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1
 Though this piece focuses on administrative and legislative process at the national level, it is clear 
that domestic judicial process may also be examined in the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court (see: Von 
Hannover (No.2) v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 15).  
2
 Friend v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 51, at [50].  
3
 Evans v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 34, at [60].  
4
 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 21, at [116].  
5
 On which see: J. Gerards, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the National Courts: Giving 
Shape to the Notion of “Shared Responsibility”’ in J. Gerards and J. Fleuren (eds), Implementation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the judgments of the ECtHR in national case-law 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014), pp.52-62.  
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measure. Such an approach emphasises the importance of domestic decision making 
processes to Strasbourg adjudication – and in so doing illustrates but one of the 
mechanisms by which the European Court gives life to the notion of subsidiarity
6
 – 
but it also runs the risk of dilution of the Convention’s potency; procedural propriety 
cannot be a proxy for proportionality, nor for ultimately ensuring the maintenance of 
the Convention’s minimum standards.7  
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter HRA), the 
United Kingdom’s jurisprudence on rights protection has been umbilically linked to 
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In spite of this, process review 
is at once orthodox and alien to United Kingdom constitutional law. Fair process lies 
at the heart of the common law of judicial review of administrative action; alongside 
illegality and irrationality, procedural impropriety provides one of the established 
grounds by which public authority decision making might be challenged. 
Traditionally, by contrast, legislative review has not been a feature of United 
Kingdom constitutional law and the courts have long regarded the propriety of 
legislative processes as lying within the exclusive domain of Parliament. Though the 
enactment of the HRA facilitates, and renders constitutionally permissible, a species 
of legislative review in the United Kingdom – additionally creating a statutory 
requirement that public authorities act compatibly with the Convention rights to 
which it gives further effect – the extent to which an effective translation of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence engaging with process review has taken place is unclear.   
In the first instance, it is clear that there is uncertainty amongst the domestic 
judiciary as regards the place of process-based review in the case-law of the 
Strasbourg court. The sense that the European Court of Human Rights is largely 
focused on matters of substance – to the virtual exclusion of procedural review – has 
served to minimise the relevance of procedural review in HRA adjuciation concerning 
executive (public authority) decision-making.
8
 Taking their lead from the supposed 
                                                 
6
 See also: Nicklinson and Lamb v United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR SE7, at [84].  
7
 On the heightened scrutiny required by a proportionality – as opposed to reasonableness or rationality 
– inquiry, see: R (on the application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 
UKHL 26; 2 AC 532, at [27]-[28].  
8
 See: R (on the application of Nasseri) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] 1 AC 1, 
at [12]-[14].  
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‘outcome orientated approach’9 of the European Court of Human Rights, the House of 
Lords and United Kingdom Supreme Court have in recent years placed the focus of 
domestic proportionality analysis on ‘the practical outcome, not the quality of the 
decision-making process that led to it.’10 In doing so, the United Kingdom’s apex 
court reveals a potential disconnect between the adjudicative approach to the 
Convention rights taken at the national and supra-national levels and simultaneously 
appears to eschew one of the standard tenets of domestic judicial review.  
The picture is complicated by the adjudicative differences between judicial 
(administrative) and legislative review at the domestic level; the former being 
traditionally driven by concerns relating to procedural legitimacy, the latter not only 
historically regarded as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty but more broadly obstructed by the fact that parliamentary process has 
been long considered to be non-justiciable. While in its examinations of the 
Convention-compliance of primary legislation under the HRA the United Kingdom’s 
apex court has stopped short of questioning the legitimacy of domestic legislative 
procedure, a closer engagement with legislative deliberative process than has 
traditionally been permitted has become evident, with courts taking the ‘quality of the 
legislative decision-making process into account when assessing whether legislation 
is compatible with Convention rights’;11 prior to the implementation of the HRA such 
an approach would have been regarded as being constitutionally illegitimate.   
The extent to which techniques of procedural review have been adopted in 
domestic adjuciation concerning the Convention rights therefore provides a lens 
through which the interplay between domestic and supra-national judicial processes 
and reasoning can usefully be examined, raising questions relating to the purpose of 
the HRA, subsidiarity and complementarity within the Convention system and the 
intensity of proportionality review as carried out by the Strasbourg and domestic 
courts.  
 
II: Process and Substance in the European Court of Human Rights 
                                                 
9
 T. Hickman, Public Law After the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), p.243.  
10
 R (on the application of Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 
AC 100, at [31]. 
11
 A. Kavanagh, ‘Proportionality and Parliamentary Debates: Exploring some Forbidden Territory’ 
(2014) 34 OJLS 443, 478-479. 
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In adjudication under the HRA, the European Court of Human Rights has frequently 
been portrayed as concerned only with the substance of a decision taken by national 
authorities. As Lord Bingham outlined in R (on the application of Begum) v 
Governors of Denbigh High School: 
 
the focus at Strasbourg is not and has never been on whether a challenged 
decision or action is the product of a defective decision-making process, but 
on whether, in the case under consideration, the applicant’s Convention rights 
have been violated.
12
 
 
As such, proportionality is viewed as ‘a test … which the Court applies in order to 
structure its own decision-making rather than a decision-making structure that it seeks 
to impose on primary decision-makers.’13 On the basis of this, so long as the outcome 
of a decision-making process achieves a proportionate balancing of rights and 
interests, compliance with the Convention might be anticipated. To say that the 
content of, or procedures adopted during, the decision-making processes of national 
authorities are irrelevant to the adjudicative processes of the European Court of 
Human Rights is, however, incorrect. For instance, the European Court clearly 
delineated two lines of inquiry in its decision in Hatton v United Kingdom: (i) an 
assessment of the substantive merits of the decision, to ensure compatibility with the 
relevant right and (ii) scrutiny of relevant decision-making processes ‘to ensure that 
due weight has been accorded to the interests of the individual.’14  
While the primary focus of the European Court is to ensure that the substance 
of the Convention rights has been protected in practice – to use the language of the 
Court, in order to ensure that the protected rights are ‘practical and effective’ rather 
than ‘theoretical and illusory’15 – decision-making processes followed at the domestic 
level are often taken by the court to demonstrate the sufficiency (or otherwise) of the 
                                                 
12
 R (on the application of Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 
AC 100, at [29].  
13
 T. Poole, ‘Of Headscarves and Heresies: The Denbigh High School Case and public authority 
decision making under the Human Rights Act’ [2005] PL 685, 690.  
14
 Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 28, at [99].  
15
 Artico v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 1, at [33].  
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justifications proposed for the member state’s actions in relation to the right in 
question. As the Strasbourg Court noted in Martinez v Spain: 
 
the court cannot satisfactorily assess whether the reasons adduced by national 
authorities to justify their decisions were ‘sufficient’ for the purposes of Art 
8(2) without at the same time determining whether the decision-making 
process, seen as a whole, provided the applicant with the requisite protection 
of his interests.
16
  
 
Procedural review can therefore be seen to play a supplementary role within the 
European Court’s overall assessment of compliance, contributing to the Court’s 
examination of proportionality rather than seeing it displaced.
17
 
In addressing the domestic decision-making process, the European Court has 
placed emphasis on the adequacy of the evidence that the interests of the claimant(s) 
have been considered in sufficient depth.
18
 This analysis may be used to affirm the 
domestic decision, or to demonstrates its deficiencies. The European Court – in its 
decision in Hirst (No.2) – made clear that ‘negative inferences’19 could be drawn from 
the failure of the United Kingdom Parliament to engage with the rights-implications 
of the denial of voting rights to convicted prisoners: 
 
                                                 
16
 Martinez v Spain (2015) 60 EHRR 3, at [147].  
17
 On which see: J. Gerards, ‘Procedural Review by the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Typology’ in this volume.  
18
 See eg: Brežec v Croatia [2014] HLR 3, at [50]. Such an approach is – in one of the leading English 
texts on the Convention – outlined as one of the general principles by which the Court approaches 
qualification of the Convention rights: ‘A limitation upon a rights, or steps taken positively to protect 
or fulfil it, will not be proportionate, even allowing for a margin of appreciation, where there is no 
evidence that the state institutions have balanced the competing individual and public interests when 
deciding on the limitations or steps, or where the requirements to be met to avoid or benefit from its 
application in a particular case are so high as not to permit a meaningful balancing process (D.J. Harris, 
M. O’Boyle, E.P. Bates and C.M. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.11).   
19
 A. Kavanagh, ‘Proportionality and Parliamentary Debates: Exploring some Forbidden Territory’ 
(2014) 34 OJLS 443, 476.  
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[T]here [was] no evidence that Parliament had ever sought to weigh the 
competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the 
right of a convicted prisoner to vote … it cannot be said that there was any 
substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued justification 
in light of modern day penal policy and of current human rights standards for 
maintaining such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote.
20
 
 
Judicial review by the European Court of Human Rights is not therefore so outcome-
centric as to be completely disassociated from the circumstances of the invidual 
complaint giving rise to the application and the processes by which that decision was 
taken by national authorities.
21
  
Nor does the Strasbourg engagement with domestic decision-making 
processes necessarily demonstrate the Court making further inroads into the policy 
and legislative autonomy of domestic authorities. Process review is also in evidence 
in those cases in which the court has deferred to the judgments, and decision-making 
processes, of national authorities.
22
 As such, where a wide margin of appreciation is 
likely to be afforded to the national authorities, ‘the Court has recognised the “special 
weight” to be accorded to the role of the domestic policy-maker in matters of general 
policy on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ 
widely.’23 In such instances, process review plays an affirmative role and can be 
regarded as an effective demonstration of the ‘shared responsibility’ of the European 
Court and national authorities for upholding the Convention’s standards.24 In those 
                                                 
20
 Hirst v United Kingdom (No.2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41, at [79]. 
21
 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom (2015) 60 EHRR 10, at 
[98].  
22
 P. Popelier and C. Van De Heyning, ‘Procedural rationality: giving teeth to the proportionality 
analysis’ (2013) European Constitutional Law Review 230, 252.  
23
 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom (2015) 60 EHRR 10, at 
[99].  
24
 Nicklinson and Lamb v United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR SE7, at [84]: ‘The contracting states are 
generally free to determine which of the three branches of government should be responsible for taking 
policy and legislative decisions which fall within their margin of appreciation and it is not for this 
Court to involve itself in their internal constitutional arrangements. However, when this Court 
concludes in any given case that an impugned legislative provision falls within the margin of 
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areas in which a wide margin may be affordable, process-based review also serves to 
(partially) counter the suggestion that the courts’ indications that intervention will 
only occur where a domestic decision is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ or ‘without legal 
foundation’25 equates to a downgrading of the standard of review.26  
 Equally, however, process review is by no means confined to those fields in 
which a wide margin of appreciation might be thought to apply. Thus, for example, in 
Animal Defenders International – a case concerned with political expression, and 
therefore typically an area in which any margin of appreciation would be relatively 
narrowly drawn
27
 – the European Court of Human Rights found that national 
authorities were ‘best placed’ to determine what should be regarded as a ‘country 
specific and complex assessment’ of the balance to be struck.28 The court went on to 
thoroughly outline the process by which the challenged ban on political advertising 
had been enacted (and subsequently found to be compatible with the requirements of 
Article 10 in domestic adjudication). The court noted that:  
 
The prohibition was … the culmination of an exceptional examination by 
Parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and legal aspects of the 
prohibition as part of the broader regulatory system governing broadcasted 
public interest expression in the United Kingdom, and all bodies found the 
prohibition to have been a necessary interference with art.10 rights. […] 
 
The proportionality of the prohibition was, nonetheless, debated in some detail 
before the High Court and the House of Lords … both levels endorsed the 
objective of the prohibition as well as the rationale of the legislative choices 
which defined its particular scope and each concluded that it was a necessary 
                                                                                                                                            
appreciation, it will often be the case that the Court is, essentially, referring to Parliament’s discretion 
to legislate as it sees fit in that particular area.’  
25
 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom (2015) 60 EHRR 10, at 
[99]. See also: James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at [43]. 
26
 P. Popelier and C. Van de Heyning, ‘Procedural Rationality: Giving Teeth to the Proportionality 
Analysis’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 230, 243.  
27
 See eg: Worm v Austria (1998) 25 EHRR 454.  
28
 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 21, at [111].  
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and proportionate interference with the applicant’s rights under art.10 of the 
Convention.  
 
The Court, for its part, attaches considerable weight to these exacting and 
pertinent reviews, by both parliamentary and judicial bodies, of the complex 
regulatory regime governing political broadcasting in the United Kingdom, 
and to their view that the general measure was necessary to prevent the 
distortion of crucial public interest debates and, thereby, the undermining of 
the democratic process.
29
 
 
Affording weight to the considered judgment of a national legislature (and/or courts) 
could be said to illustrate in practice that ‘[s]ubsidiarity is at the very heart of the 
Convention’ and is demonstrative that the European Court is ‘intended to be 
subsidiary to the national systems’.30 Critics of such an approach however argue that – 
rather than off-setting a rather more modest rationality-style review – endorsement of 
a domestic process in review is used by the court in order to ‘appease’31 those 
member states in which the reach and influence of the Strasbourg court is the source 
of political controversy and scepticism.
32
 But, just as an overly abstract approach to 
judicial review may see European Court decisions excessively divorced from the 
‘vital forces’33 at play across the member states, a purely ‘country specific’34 
approach to adjudication would undermine the court’s ability to shape common, 
minimum, standards between signatories to the Convention. While the term 
‘appeasement’ connotes submission in the face of opposition, recourse to review 
                                                 
29
 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 21, at [114]-[116].  
30
 Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14, at [61]. And see: M. Saul, ‘The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments’ (2015) HRLR 1.  
31
 See: H. Fenwick, ‘Enhanced Subsidiarity and a Dialogic Approach – or Appeasement in recent cases 
on Criminal Justice, Public Order, Counter-Terrorism at Strasbourg against the UK?’ in K. Ziegler, E. 
Wicks and L. Hodson, The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015). 
32
 For a perspective from the United Kingdom see: R. Masterman, ‘The United Kingdom’ in P. 
Popelier and S. Lambrecht (eds), Shifting the Convention System: Counter-Dynamics at the National 
Level (Intersentia, 2015 (forthcoming)). 
33
 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, at [48]. 
34
 Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 21, at [111].  
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which is critical of domestic decision-making process demonstrates that procedural 
review cannot be uniformly seen as such. Rather, procedural review is best 
encapsulated as one of a number of mechanisms at the disposal of the court which 
may be utilised in order to emphasise the subsidiarity in the Convention system.  
That process review is essentially a discretionary tool in the hands of the Court 
is, however, problematic. A lack of specificity as regards the circumstances in which 
the Court might invoke procedural techniques of review has prompted a degree of 
concern relating to the consistency of the Court’s adjudicatory approach.35 It is further 
acknowledged – and evidenced by the fine margin by which the Animal Defenders 
International case was decided
36
 – that the Court itself is divided on the extent to 
which domestic processes should influence the standard of Strasbourg review.
37
 Both 
factors can be seen to underpin – in part at least – the uncertain domestic response to 
procedural human rights review pursuant to the HRA. 
 
III: Procedural Judicial Review in the United Kingdom 
Judicial Review in the United Kingdom is bifurcated, with review of administrative 
action and of legislation regarded as being conceptually distinct. As regards the 
former, judicial review of administrative action remains a largely procedural 
guarantee; the common law of judicial review provides for a supervisory, rather than 
an appellate, jurisdiction which is focused on the legality of a decision (rather than its 
merits, or substance).
38
 Judicial review of legislation meanwhile is a relatively recent 
                                                 
35
 See: C. Barrow, ‘RMT v United Kingdom: The European Court of Human Rights intimidated into 
timidity or merely consistent in its inconsistency?’ [2015] EHRLR 277 and generally M. Saul, ‘The 
European Court of Human Rights’ Margin of Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments’ 
(2015) HRLR 1.  
36
 The case was determined by a split in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 9:8.  
37
 Judge Spano, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ 
(2014) 14 HRLR 487, 497.  
38
 The canonical articulation of the substantive grounds of judicial review at common law can be found 
in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 410-411 (Lord 
Diplock): ‘one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative 
action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality,” the second 
“irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety.” […] By “illegality” as a ground for judicial 
review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-
making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question 
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addition to a constitutional system in which legislative process lay – and which 
substantially lies still – beyond the realms of justiciability. Legislative review is 
limited to scenarios in which domestic statute is alleged to be in contravention of 
European laws;
39
 there exists no freestanding or common law power to review the 
constitutionality or legality of primary legislation. Enactment of the HRA has 
therefore legitimated judicial scrutiny of the compatibility of primary legislation with 
the Convention rights,
40
 and introduced a statutory species of illegality to the existing 
common law grounds of judicial review (introducing a further sub-division into the 
domestic law of judicial review in so doing
41
). The foundation of the latter can be 
found in Section 6 of the HRA which renders it ‘unlawful for a public authority to act 
in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.’ As will be seen, this 
provision has also been interpreted as directing courts’ analysis towards the substance 
of public body decision making and away from the traditional procedural focus of 
judicial review at common law. 
 
(a) Judicial Review of Administrative/Executive Action 
                                                                                                                                            
to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the 
state is exercisable. By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 
“Wednesbury unreasonableness” (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic 
or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it. […] I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety” rather 
than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards 
the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under 
this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly 
laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure 
does not involve any denial of natural justice.’ 
39
 Pursuant to the provisions of the European Communities Act 1972 and Human Rights Act 1998.  
40
 Section 3(1) HRA provides: ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’ (s.4 
permits that legislation which cannot be rendered compatible with the Convention rights via 
interpretative means may be subject to a judicial declaration of incompatibility). 
41
 With proportionality review (in HRA adjudication) co-existing alongside Wednesbury 
(reasonableness) review within administrative and common law. For a recent assessment of this 
division see: J.N.E. Varuhas, ‘Against Unification’ in H. Wilberg and M. Elliott, The Scope and 
Intensity of Substantive Review (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).  
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Fair process lies at the very heart of English administrative law:  
 
The teeth of public law are in process review. Most successful judicial review 
claims succeed on the basis that the decision-maker has done something in the 
wrong way, rather than the decision-maker has done something that is, all 
things considered, unjustifiable.
42
  
 
Many of the central principles of the common law of judicial review of administrative 
action can therefore be seen to highlight procedural flaws or defects in executive 
decision-making. As such, decisions might be challenged – and might be 
demonstrated to fail to meet the standards required under the head of natural justice – 
on the ground that the relevant decision-maker was biased,
43
 that the claimant was 
denied a fair hearing
44
 or that the claimant enjoyed a reasonable expectation which 
had been frustrated by the decision.
45
 Similarly, procedural defects in decision-
making may also give rise to a challenge on the basis of a decision’s illegality; taking 
decisions on the basis of irrelevant considerations
46
 and the use of an allocated power 
for an improper purpose
47
 both amount to essentially procedural grounds of illegality.  
The common law jurisdiction of judicial review has therefore traditionally 
eschewed review of the substance, or merits, of executive or administrative decisions; 
judicial review permits intervention in defective public body decision-making, it does 
not permit the court to substitute its own decision for that which has been challenged. 
As Mead has argued, ‘only if the challenge is based on irrationality has there been any 
level of substantive review.’48 The law relating to judicial review of administrative 
action developed in this way in order to ensure that powers delegated by Parliament to 
                                                 
42
 T. Hickman, Public Law After the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), p.225.  
43
 See eg: Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Co Proprietors (1852) 3 HLC 759; R v Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [2000] 1 AC 199.  
44
 See eg: Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180; Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 
40.  
45
 See eg: R v Liverpool Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association [1972] 2 
QB 299.  
46
 See eg: Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578.  
47
 See eg: Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054.  
48
 D. Mead, ‘Outcomes aren’t all: defending process-based judicial review of public authority decisions 
under the Human Rights Act’ [2012] PL 61, 63.  
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officials were validly exercised in accordance with the terms of the delegation.
49
 The 
corollary of this ultra vires approach is recognition of the necessary (and intra vires) 
policy autonomy of public bodies and elected officials. Judicial review in English law 
has traditionally reflected a ‘conception of limited judicial authority, recognising that 
in most cases a public authority may exercise a genuine choice between competing 
public policy objectives and contrasting methods of implementation.’50  
 
(b) Legislative and/or Constitutional Review 
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty and Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 
provide the pillars on which the traditional non-justiciability of both legislative 
content and legislative process are based. Parliamentary sovereignty – and the 
consequent (and concurrent) supremacy of primary legislation – has served to focus 
judicial attempts to interpret the law around the specific statutory language adopted: 
‘what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law.’51 This constitutional presumption of 
statutory legality has conditioned (self-)perceptions of the judicial function, as well as 
the legitimate targets of judicial review.
52
 As a result, in British Railways Board v 
Pickin – having been asked to set aside a statutory provision on the basis that 
Parliament had been fraudulently misled into enacting it – the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords emphatically found that the court enjoyed no competence to 
examine the propriety of parliamentary procedure. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said 
the following: 
 
It must surely be for Parliament to lay down the procedures which are to be 
followed before a Bill can become an Act. It must be for Parliament to decide 
whether its decreed procedures have in fact been followed. It must be for 
Parliament to lay down and to construe its Standing Orders and further to 
decide whether they have been obeyed: it must be for Parliament to decide 
                                                 
49
 For analysis see: P. Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial Review’ [1999] PL 428.  
50
 T.R.S. Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of “Due Deference”’ [2006] CLJ 671, 
679.  
51
 V. Bogdanor, Politics and the Constitution: Essays on British Government (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1996), p.5 (emphasis added).  
52
 For an overview see: R. Masterman and J.E.K. Murkens, ‘Skirting Supremacy and Subordination: 
The Constitutional Authority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court’ [2013] PL 800.  
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whether in any particular case to dispense with ampleness with such orders. It 
must be for Parliament to decide whether it is satisfied that an Act should be 
passed in the form and with the wording set out in the Act. It must be for 
Parliament to decide what documentary material or testimony it requires and 
the extent to which Parliamentary privilege should attach. It would be 
impracticable and undesirable for the High Court of Justice to embark upon an 
inquiry concerning the effect or the effectiveness of the internal procedures in 
the High Court of Parliament or an inquiry whether in any particular case 
those procedures were effectively followed.
53
 
 
The decision in Pickin drew on a series of established common law authorities, not 
least among which was Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. v Wauchope. In that 
decision, Lord Campbell had made the following remarks:  
 
no court of justice can inquire into the mode in which [primary legislation] 
was introduced into Parliament, nor into what was done previous to its 
introduction, or what passed in Parliament during its progress in its various 
stages through both Houses.
54
  
 
As a result, courts have treated parliamentary process as lying beyond the legitimate 
realms of judicial inquiry.  
 That judicial interpretation of statute is a process which is in a sense 
disassociated from the legislative procedures which saw the legislation enacted is 
confirmed by the Bill of Rights 1688, Article 9 of which provides that ‘freedom of 
speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.’ Article 9 is – Kavanagh argues – 
therefore commonly ‘understood to preclude any judicial recourse to Hansard for the 
purposes of statutory interpretation.’55 In other words, the evidence from which courts 
derive their understanding of statutory purpose comes largely from the output of 
legislative deliberations – the legislation itself – rather than from arguments advanced 
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(or not advanced) during the course of the legislative process. The extent to which the 
courts have held themselves to respect the procedural and substantive legislative 
autonomy of Parliament can be seen in the relatively narrowly-drawn circumstances 
under which it is regarded as being legitimate for courts to utilise Hansard as an aid to 
statutory construction. It is only since the seminal decision of the House of Lords in 
Pepper v Hart – in 1992 – that judicial reference to parliamentary debates has been 
permitted, and even then only in order to illuminate legislative intent in those 
circumstances where the apparent interpretation of the statute would lead to an 
ambiguity or absurdity.
56
 
 
IV: Process Review and the influence of the Human Rights Act 
That the HRA was not intended to vest disproportionate authority in the judges – to 
the detriment of the elected branches of government – is well documented.57 To the 
extent that it is a meaningful term of constitutional discourse, the HRA is a ‘dialogic’ 
instrument, which allocates responsibility for the realisation of the rights it protects 
across the branches of state. To this end, the processes of public body decision-
making were almost certainly intended to be impacted upon by the enactment of the 
HRA.
58
 As Lord Irvine of Lairg QC – Lord Chancellor and one of the architects of the 
Act – argued before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights in 2001:  
  
a culture of respect for human rights is to create a society in which our public 
institutions are habitually, automatically responsive to human rights 
considerations in relation to every procedure they follow, in relation to every 
decision they take, in relation to every piece of legislation they sponsor.
59
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It was clear that the Labour government’s intentions were that the HRA precipitate a 
step-change in governmental decision-making; as the Home Office Minister, Lord 
Williams, echoed in the House of Lords:  
 
Every public authority will know that its behaviour, its structure, its 
conclusions and its executive actions will be subject to this culture.
60
 
 
Enforcement of the HRA therefore imposes upon public bodies (including courts, but 
excluding Parliament) a statutory obligation to act in compliance with the Convention 
rights.  
Though the Act excluded Parliament from its definition of public authorities to 
whom section 6 would apply,
61
 it is clear that some modification of legislative process 
was envisaged. The Act requires that draft legislation be stated compatible with the 
Convention rights upon being debated in Parliament (although makes provision for 
proposals which cannot be so endorsed to proceed).
62
 The HRA has also seen the 
establishment of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and – in the 
event of a judicial finding that primary legislation cannot be interpreted in a way 
which would achieve Convention-compliance
63
 – provides that the locus of remedial 
action should be within the elected arms of government.
64
 It is this characteristic of 
the HRA which emphasises the conceptual and practical distance between the 
compact between branches that it seeks to engineer and the judicio-centric precedents 
of many of its constitutional comparators. 
Whilst the Act itself makes few prescriptions as to how public decision-
makers are to go about the processes of achieving compliance with the protected 
rights, section 2(1) does impose a burden of process upon the courts who, in 
determining questions arising in connection with the Convention rights, must ‘take 
into account’ decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The judicial 
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approach resulting from this obligation initially saw domestic courts positioned as 
domestic proxies for the European Court of Human Rights, with the consequence that 
the substance of the emergent HRA jurisprudence very closely replicated its 
Strasbourg counterpart. The development of this so-called mirror principle
65
 therefore 
fed criticisms of the HRA scheme which argued that the jurisprudence of the 
European Court was afforded too great an influence in the domestic sphere to the 
exclusion of distinctly domestic approaches to human rights adjuciation. Examination 
of the extent to which the European Court’s use of methods of process review have 
been translated into domestic adjudication reveals an important disconnect between 
rights adjudication at the supra-national and national judicial levels (as well as 
between pre- and post-HRA approaches to judicial review).    
 
(a) Away from process-based review of administrative decisions? 
Section 6 of the HRA renders it unlawful for public authorities – or private bodies 
exercising public functions – to ‘act’ in a way which is incompatible with the 
Convention rights.
66
 The primary focus of section 6 is on the substance of a public 
body’s decision:  
 
The first question that section 6 asks is result-orientated – were the claimant’s 
Convention rights violated by the public authority? If the answer is affirmative 
the process by which the public authority came to violate his or her 
Convention rights is irrelevant.
67
 
 
While it is certainly arguable that ‘acts’ of public authorities encompass the processes 
by which decisions were taken, adjudication under the HRA has seen a judicial 
reluctance to impose specific procedural requirements on public body decisions 
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impacting on the Convention rights. The compliance with and/or proportionality of 
public body decisions with the Convention rights is a matter of an ex post facto 
assessment by the courts which is primarily directed towards the result or outcome of 
public body decision-making.  
Two cases in particular have served to cement an approach to Convention-
compliance which is primarily based on the outcomes of public body decision-
making. The first of these decisions – R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School68 – 
concerned a challenge made to the imposition of a School’s uniform policy on the 
ground that it prohibited the wearing of certain forms of religious dress and was 
therefore an infringement of the claimant’s Article 9 rights.69 The second – Belfast 
City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd70 – concerned the denial, by a local authority, of a 
licence to use premises as a sex shop. In both decisions, the apex court found against a 
process of review which would have imposed overly-onerous procedural obligations 
on the relevant public body.
71
  
To contextualise this debate, the Court of Appeal in Denbigh – per Brooke LJ 
– would have seen the public body decision-maker respond to the following series of 
questions:  
 
(1) Has the claimant established that she has a relevant Convention right 
which qualifies for protection under article 9(1)? (2) Subject to any 
justification that is established under article 9(2), has that Convention right 
been violated? (3) Was the interference with her Convention right prescribed 
by law in the Convention sense of the expression? (4) Did the interference 
have a legitimate aim? (5) What as the considerations that need to be balanced 
against each other when determining whether the interference was necessary 
                                                 
68
 R (on the application of Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 
AC 100. 
69
 Specifically, the policy did not permit female Muslim students to wear the jilbab, instead permitting 
them to wear the shalwar kameeze.  
70
 Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] UKHL 19; [2007] 1 WLR 1420.  
71
 A third case reiterated the findings in Begum and Miss Behavin’: R (on the application of Nasseri) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 23; [2010] 1 AC 1.  
18 
 
in a democratic society for the purposes of achieving that aim? (6) Was the 
interference justified under article 9(2)?
72
  
 
On appeal to the House of Lords, the Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham, found that 
judicial enquiry should focus on ‘the practical outcome, not the quality of the 
decision-making process that led to it.’73 Echoing the approach to the interpretation of 
section 6(1) noted above, Lord Bingham found that ‘[t]he unlawfulness proscribed by 
s.6(1) is acting in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right, not relying on 
a defective process of reasoning.’74 As the House of Lords subsequently confirmed in 
the decision in Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd, the central question for the 
courts must always be to adjudge whether the relevant decision infringed the 
applicant’s Convention rights. Even in adjudication over those Convention rights with 
‘procedural content’: 
 
… the question is still whether there has been an actual violation of the 
applicant’s Convention rights and not whether the decision-maker properly 
considered the question of whether his rights would be violated or not.
75
 
 
The House of Lords advanced three primary reasons for the avoidance of requiring 
public bodies to adhere to specific structural requirements in the making of decisions 
which might impact on an individual’s Convention rights. The first of these reasons 
might be labelled ‘constitutional’, the second ‘practical’, the third ‘institutional’. 
First, the Law Lords noted that such an approach would be inconsistent with 
their understanding of the requirements of the Convention. The Convention rights 
require that the substance of the right (eg family life, freedom of religion) is 
guaranteed. When speaking to substantive rights, the Convention is not prescriptive 
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about the process to be followed by the public authority; what is mandated is the 
protection of the right in substance. As explained by Lord Hoffmann in Begum: 
 
[A]rticle 9 is concerned with substance, not procedure. It confers no right to 
have a decision made in any particular way. What matters is the result: was the 
right to manifest a religious belief restricted in a way which is not justified 
under article 9(2)?
76
 
 
The approach of the House of Lords on this point was informed by an approach to the 
interpretation of the HRA which viewed the purpose of the Act being to give better 
effect to rights (and remedies) which would otherwise only be available to claimants 
at Strasbourg.
77
 The approach is neatly summarised by Lord Nicholls in the decision 
in R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Quark 
Fishing:  
 
The [Human Rights] Act was intended to provide a domestic remedy where a 
remedy would have been available in Strasbourg. Conversely, the Act was not 
intended to provide a domestic remedy where a remedy would not have been 
available in Strasbourg.
78
   
 
The House of Lords’ decisions are therefore grounded in an approach to the 
interpretation of the HRA which sees domestic courts positioned as local proxies for 
the Strasbourg court, their task being to ‘assess how a claim by [an] appellant … 
would fare before the European Court of Human Rights.’79 (Given the failure of the 
House of Lords to acknowledge the procedural turn of the Strasbourg court, it should 
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be noted that the apex court’s approach extends to replicating the adjudicative 
outcome that could be expected at Strasbourg, rather than the adjudicative 
methodology of the European Court.) 
Secondly, it would be impractical and/or inefficient to expect public 
authorities to engage in detailed, legalistic analysis measuring the requirements of the 
relevant Convention right against the measure under consideration.
80 
Lord Hoffmann 
in Miss Behavin’ argued that, as a result, the Human Rights Act could not impose 
such obligations on public bodies: ‘[a] construction of the 1998 Act which requires 
ordinary citizens in local government to produce such formulaic incantations would 
make it ridiculous.’81 The third ground for the avoidance of the process-focused 
approach relates to misunderstanding of institutional competence and expertise and an 
acknowledgment that public authorities will often not possess the competence or 
expertise to conduct a precise proportionality analysis. As Lord Hoffmann put it in 
Begum, ‘teachers and governors cannot be expected to make such decisions with 
textbooks on human rights law at their elbows.’82 
As to the departure from the traditional process focused approach of judicial 
review, in R (on the application of Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School, 
Lord Hoffmann made explicit the divergence between review on the basis of the 
Convention rights and the orthodox approach to judicial review:  
 
In domestic judicial review, the court is usually concerned with whether the 
decision-maker reached his decision in the right way rather than whether he 
got what the court might think to be the right answer. But Article 9 is 
concerned with substance, not procedure.
83
 
 
As Lord Hoffmann continued, ‘no display of human rights learning’ by public bodies 
could render compatible a decision which, in the view of the court, violated the 
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applicant’s rights.84 It was clear from the speech of the Baroness Hale that HRA 
review should be regarded as being conceptually and procedurally distinct from 
judicial review as ordinarily conceived: 
 
The role of the court in human rights adjudication is quite different from the 
role of the court in ordinary judicial review of administrative action. In human 
rights adjudication, the court is concerned with whether the human rights of 
the claimant have in fact been infringed, not with whether the administrative 
decision-maker properly took them into account.
85
 
 
It follows from this that, while the requirements of proportionality could prompt 
public authority decision makers to analyse the potential impact of (less intrusive) 
alternatives to the proposed policy decision, this analysis need not impose an undue 
burden on public authorities and need not be explicitly Convention based. While it 
may be open to public bodies to consider the potential impact of a particular policy or 
decision in substantive human rights terms – and while there may be good reasons for 
doing so – it is not a requirement of the decision-making process which will be 
imposed by the court. Section 6(1) of the HRA does not therefore seem to require 
public bodies to engage with the substance of the Convention rights themselves 
during the decision-making process; it is the outcome of that process which the courts 
will assess for Convention compliance.  
 The appropriateness of this outcome-focused approach has, however, been 
widely contested. One view suggests that the potency of the HRA as a tool of rights 
protection can be evidenced in the ability of the courts to ‘make authoritative 
determinations as to what the Convention rights require.’86 Poole’s criticisms of the 
process-focused approach of the Court of Appeal in Begum therefore accuse the court 
of making a ‘fetish of procedure’ and warn against the ‘excessive judicialisation of 
the public sphere.’87 By contrast, the apparent absurdity of the outcomes approach is 
effectively captured by Hickman: 
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The effect of the House of Lords’ judgments … is that even where a decision-
maker decides a case by an irrational process of reasoning, or even without 
any consideration at all, it will be compatible with the Convention rights and it 
will be consistent with the decision-maker’s responsibilities under the Human 
Rights Act, as long as the outcome is compatible with the Convention rights.
88
 
 
Given that one of the stated objectives of the HRA was to fully integrate human rights 
considerations in the processes of public authority decision making – an alternative 
view categorises the outcomes approach as being based on ‘judicial exclusivity’89 and 
therefore unable to fully account for, or give credit to, public body decisions which 
consider human rights considerations, and an inadequate characterisation of the 
HRA’s rather more ‘diffuse’ scheme.90 As a result Dickson has argued that the failure 
of the courts to encourage rights-respecting processes in public body decision-making 
‘strikes at the heart of the mission of the Human Rights Act, which is to inculcate an 
appreciation of human rights in all public authorities.’91 
 
(b) Towards judicial examination of legislative process? 
The HRA was also intended to embed rights concerns into the pre-legislative, and 
legislative, processes of the United Kingdom Parliament.
92
 Given that a stated aim of 
the HRA’s authors was that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty remain 
undisturbed,
93
 and the traditional reluctance of courts in the United Kingdom to 
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explicitly engage with issues of legislative process, it might readily be assumed that 
questions relating to the Convention compatibility of primary legislation would also 
be primarily oriented towards an outcomes-focused assessment.  
The increased willingness of courts to (prior to enactment of the Human 
Rights Act) utilise purposive methods of interpretation had already prompted a 
movement away from the highly positivist approaches that had dominated judicial 
reasoning during much of the twentieth century.
94
 But the obligation imposed upon 
courts by section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act required further refinement of the 
judicial approach, with judges required to assess the compatibility of primary 
legislation with the requirements of the Convention rights. Inherent in this task – and 
assuming engagement and a prima facie interference with one of the protected rights – 
is the requirement that courts ask whether the measure is proportionate to the aim 
pursued. It was clear from the outset that the approach of the courts to the application 
of section 3(1) was not to be so focused as to require only linguistic assessment of 
statutory purpose:  
 
In enacting section 3(1), it cannot have been the intention of Parliament to 
place those asserting their rights at the mercy of the linguistic choices of the 
individual who happened to draft the provision in question. What matters is 
not so much the particular phraseology chosen by the draftsman as the 
substance of the measure which Parliament had enacted in those words.
95
 
 
As the House of Lords noted in Ghaidan v Godin Mendoza, the task of the court in 
applying section 3(1) is to ‘concentrat[e] on matters of substance, rather than on 
matters of mere language.’96 In the sphere of statutory interpretation, as with 
questions of public body decision making, the courts have taken outcomes to be their 
focus of their enquiry into the Convention-compatibilty of an Act. The point was 
reiterated in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment; ‘the 
proportionality of a statutory measure is to be judged objectively and not by the 
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quality of reasons advanced in support of the measure in the course of parliamentary 
debate.’97  
The European Court’s reliance on process review has emphasised that the 
content of legislative deliberation can support a finding of proportionality. Direct and 
routine engagement with Hansard for the purpose of assessing the quality of 
legislative process is, however, impermissible. In the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Wilson v First County Trust, the suggestion that the justificatory questions posed by 
proportionality analysis required a more interventionist approach was discernible:  
 
It is one thing to accept the need to defer to an opinion which can be seen to be 
the product of reasoned consideration based on policy; it is quite another thing 
to be required to accept, without question, an opinion for which no reason of 
policy is advanced.
98
 
 
By analogy, the court appears to acknowledge the artificiality of a proportionality 
assessment which is premised on the orthodox approach to statutory interpretation by 
the courts, that is, a sovereignty-driven acceptance of the legality of the measure 
under which the assessment of arguments advanced, or not advanced, during 
legislative debates is non-justiciable.  
 In spite of this, idications that the courts indirectly acknowledge parliamentary 
deliberation of legislation affecting the Convention rights are not difficult to find, and 
it is relatively commonplace to see reference to the ‘great weight’99 which the courts 
acknowledge should attach to legislative decisions, and the presumption of 
parliamentary competence to determine how competing societal interests be balanced 
during the legislative process; ‘line[s] must be drawn, and it is for Parliament to 
decide where.’100 In those cases involving social and economic policy and the 
allocation of governmental resources the highest courts have similarly indicated that 
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‘the choices that are to be made can easily be seen as falling within the discretionary 
area of judgment best left to the considered opinion of the legislature.’101  
 Examining the extent to which the courts are engaging with the ‘forbidden 
territory’ of parliamentary process and debate, Kavanagh has asked whether such 
statements are ‘rhetorical flourishes to emphasize the superior status of legislation’ or 
whether ‘they have a greater practical significance for judicial assessments about 
whether legislation complies with Convention rights?’102 Kavanagh concludes that the 
Law Lords and Supreme Court have drawn both positive and negative inferences from 
the extent of parliamentary engagement with the implications for the protected 
Convention rights in the process of proportionality analysis. Some caution is needed 
here, however, as – even though the Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged that 
parliamentary process can affect the intensity of review
103
 – the depth in which 
legislative process is susceptible to judicial examination is subject to ongoing 
limitations.  
 The leading case remains the House of Lords decision in Wilson v First 
County Trust.
104
 As Lord Nicholls outlined in that decision the court must ask 
‘whether the means employed by the statute to achieve the policy objective is 
appropriate and not disproportionate to its adverse effect.’105 While, as a result, it may 
be necessary for a court to consider Hansard in order to be in a ‘better position to 
understand the legislation’, the House of Lords was careful to note that the modesty of 
the change in approach the HRA would require. Lord Nicholls made the following 
observations:  
 
Beyond [the] use of Hansard as a source of background information, the 
content of parliamentary debates has no direct relevance to the issues the court 
is called upon to decide in compatibility cases and, hence, these debates are 
not a proper matter for investigation or consideration by the courts. In 
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particular, it is a cardinal constitutional principle that the will of Parliament is 
expressed in the language used by it in its enactments. The proportionality of 
legislation is to be judged on that basis. The courts are to have due regard to 
the legislation as an expression of the will of Parliament. The proportionality 
of a statutory measure is not to be judged by the quality of reasons advanced 
in support of it in the course of parliamentary debate, or by the subjective state 
of mind of individual ministers or other members … Lack of cogent 
justification in the course of parliamentary debate is not a matter which 
‘counts against’ the legislation on issues of proportionality. The court is called 
upon to evaluate the proportionality of the legislation, not the adequacy of the 
minister’s exploration of the policy options or of his explanations to 
Parliament. The latter would contravene Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The 
court would then be presuming to evaluate the sufficiency of the legislative 
process leading up to the enactment of the statute.
106
 
 
While the court is ultimately concerned with the proportionality of the statutory 
measure under debate, the extent to which government has – or has not – considered 
alternative, less intrusive, measures would not appear to be a legitimate line of 
judicial inquiry. Whether a statute is considered to be Convention compliant is largely 
an objective judicial assessment which ‘must be judged primarily by what the 
legislation] provides.’107 Judicial examination of legislative process within such a 
proportionality analysis is very much confined to a quantitative, rather than 
qualitative, assessment.  
 
V: A Moderated Approach? 
In the context of review of public authority decision-making, considerations regarding 
the process by which the public authority arrived at the decision are not, and should 
not be, dismissed as irrelevant. Considerations of substance and process are not 
mutually exclusive;
108
 the courts are grappling with the the extent of the relevance and 
weight that ought to be attributed to process when deciding whether a measure or 
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decision has unjustifiably interfered with a Convention right. Decision-making 
process will not impact upon a court’s assessment of whether a Convention right is 
engaged, or whether there has been a prima facie interference with the right in 
question. Rather, as with questions relating to the expertise or constitutional 
competence of the primary decision-maker should carry weight, considerations of 
process may factor in judicial analysis: a thorough, consultative process can positively 
influence the court’s assessment of proportionality, while a deficient process – can 
weigh against such a finding. In the sphere of public body decision-making at least, 
while a structured proportionality analysis will not be judicially-required of primary 
decision-makers, evidence that a ‘Convention-like’ analysis had taken place might 
weigh in favour of the decision-maker in the court’s assessment. As Lord Neuberger 
suggested in Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd: 
 
… it seems to me … that where a council has properly considered the issue in 
relation to a particular application, the court is inherently less likely to 
conclude that the decision ultimately infringes the applicant’s rights.109 
 
On this reading, process – it would seem – is not entirely irrelevant to the court’s 
assessment of proportionality. Developing Lord Neuberger’s approach to the 
weighing of process considerations, Baroness Hale went some way towards outlining 
what ‘proper’ process might entail. The primary question for the court to resolve, 
Baroness Hale observed, was whether or not the claimant’s Convention rights had 
been infringed.
110
 The court’s response to that question was not – however – to be 
completely disassociated from the decision-making process undertaken by the 
primary decision-maker:  
 
… the court has to decide whether the authority has violated the Convention 
rights. In doing so, it is bound to acknowledge that the local authority is much 
better placed than the court to decide whether the right of sex shop owners to 
sell pornographic literature and images should be restricted-for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
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protection of the rights of others. But the views of the local authority are 
bound to carry less weight where the local authority has made no attempt to 
address that question. Had the Belfast City Council expressly set itself the task 
of balancing the rights of individuals to sell and buy pornographic literature 
and images against the interests of the wider community, a court would find it 
hard to upset the balance which the local authority had struck. But where there 
is no indication that this has been done, the court has no alternative but to 
strike the balance for itself, giving due weight to the judgments made by those 
who are in much closer touch with the people and the places involved than the 
court could ever be.
111
 
 
Both Neuberger and Hale point towards an approach which maintains the HRA’s 
focus on substance, without jettisoning the established procedural focus of domestic 
judicial review. Both also indicate that the integration of Convention rights reasoning 
into public authority decision-making can weigh affirmatively in favour of a finding 
of compatibility. Decisions taken in the aftermath of Denbigh and Miss Behavin’ 
illustrate that a failure to consider the rights implications of a decision might also 
permit adverse inferences to be drawn from the failure of decision-making processes 
to engage with the Convention implications of a decision.
112
 Given the apparent 
primacy of outcome-focused judicial analysis highlighted by the above discussion, it 
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is important to note that the language of section 6 does not foreclose a broader 
interpretation which would view ‘acts’ of public bodies as including decisions taken 
and the broader processes through which those decisions were generated. As a result, 
the ability of courts to scrutinise administrative processes is not definitively precluded 
by the HRA itself, even though the primary focus of the judicial enquiry has tended to 
be taken – on the basis of both section 6 and the perceived approach of the European 
Court – to be primarily directed towards decision-making outcomes.  
By contrast with section 6, the target of section 3(1) HRA is, linguistically, 
rather more precise: ‘primary … legislation.’ In spite of this, the implementation of 
the HRA has also prompted a subtle revision of the orthodox understanding of the 
courts’ approach to examination of legislative process. Courts will afford weight to 
the judgment of the legislature over the legislative resolution of ‘controversial and 
complex questions of fact arising out of moral and social dilemmas’113 on the basis of 
Parliament’s expert judgment and capacity to accommodate diverse perspectives and 
have been prepared to draw inferences from the apparent depth and diligence of 
legislative scrutiny. But the extent of this change should not be overstated: the degree 
to which courts might – to use the wording of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights – 
question the quality of the parliamentary process remains an area around which the 
courts are cautious. As much has been observed most recently in the UK Supreme 
Court’s decision in HS2 (albeit in the context a dispute concerned primarily with the 
influence of EU law):  
 
Scrutiny of the workings of Parliament and whether they satisfy externally 
imposed criteria clearly involves questioning and potentially impeaching (i.e. 
condemning) Parliament’s internal proceedings.114 
 
The abiding judicial view that an assessment of ‘the quality of ministerial 
consideration of the policy options available in the context of the evolution of a 
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particular legislative measure’ would ‘contravene article 9 of the Bill of Rights 
1689’115 makes detailed scrutiny of legislative process constitutionally impermissible.  
Given this significant limitation on the use of parliamentary debates during the 
adjudicative process, it is unsurprising to find that ‘British courts are much more 
content to elicit the legislative mischief or purpose from other “external aids” to 
construction’, including Select Committee documents, White Papers, Law 
Commission reports and so on.
116
 While such sources may well illuminate a courts’ 
assessment of legislative intent, the inability of courts to carefully examine the 
adequacy of the primary reasons advanced for legislative change ensures first that 
judicial focus remains on the outcome of parliamentary deliberations – the legislation 
– and second that attempts to ‘give weight’ to parliamentary consideration of 
competing interests will continue to be blighted by suggestions of institutional 
‘servility, or perhaps gracious concession’117 to the superior constitutional position of 
Parliament. For so long as assessment of the adequacy of legislative process remains 
beyond the constitutional Rubicon, domestic courts will be ill-positioned to fully 
appraise the proportionality of a legislative measure; a court’s assessment of the 
quality of the legislative process will necessarily remain impressionistic, rather than 
forensic. As such, the domestic proportionality exercise will continue to display the 
artificiality highlighted above, given its potential disconnection from the content of 
relevant parliamentary debates, and the informed judicial accordance of weight will 
be compromised through the inability of the court to fully examine the available 
evidence advanced (publicly) in support of a chosen legislative course. While courts 
are rightly concerned to avoid the subversion of the democratic process, it is also 
recognised that the extent to which a decision might be legitimately referred to as the 
‘the considered judgment of a democratic assembly will vary according to the subject 
matter and the circumstances.’118 Judicial recourse to proxies for the quality of 
legislative consideration may be appropriate, but cannot always provide the 
justificatory evidence which would underpin effective proportionality analysis. It may 
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be more obviously acceptable to, for instance, afford positive weight to a legislative 
decision taken following a manifesto commitment, consultation process and lengthy 
parliamentary process than it would be to afford weight to emergency legislation 
drafted and debated in the absence of broader deliberation. But to deny, in the latter 
circumstance, the courts the ability to evaluate what primary evidence in favour of the 
proposals may be gleaned from the parliamentary debates is to constitutionally 
impose an obstacle to informed proportionality analysis which denies the court the 
ability to fully assess whether the claimant’s (or any other) interests have been 
considered in sufficient depth. It might be suggested that a quantitative assessment of 
legislative process might well be appropriate for a supra-national court seeking to give 
effect to principles of subsidiarity. Whether it is appropriate for a domestic court to 
conduct a similar exercise – and comprehensively examine the proportionality of a 
legislative measure – is open to question.  
 
VI: The Interplay with Strasbourg: Subsidiarity, Complementarity or 
Confusion? 
The above analysis suggests a lack of continuity between the approaches to review 
adopted at the Strasbourg and domestic levels, and as between the standards of – and 
approaches to – judicial review of administrative action at common law, and the 
legislative and public body judicial review sanctioned by the HRA. The procedural 
focus of judicial review at common law has not been fully replicated either in the 
species of legislative or judicial review prompted by enactment of the HRA. Nor has 
the European Court’s willingness to inform its proportionality analysis through 
examination of the adequacy of domestic decision-making processes been 
consistently acknowledged in HRA review. That domestic courts operate under the 
misapprehension that the European Court is largely unconcerned with matters of 
process speaks to both the lack of certainty as to circumstances in which process 
review is appropriate and provides evidence of a disconnect from the Strasbourg case 
law (contrary to common perceptions regarding the linkages between the domestic 
and supra-national levels) which might be seen to limit the potential of the HRA to 
instil a broad-based culture of rights. 
Regardless of the administrative or legislative target of judicial review, a focus 
on outcomes – to the exclusion of process – ‘flies in the face of collaborative – 
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dialogic – approaches to resolving rights disputes’119 and can increasingly be seen to 
be in tension with the reasoning processes of the European Court, and with broader 
attempts to fully integrate subsidiarity into the fabric of the Convention system.
120
 
The tendency towards an outcomes-focused approach ‘reinforces the idea of the HRA 
as a juricentric constitutional document’121 at a time when the European Court of 
Human Rights is consciously seeking to demonstrate that respect for the considered 
decisions of national legislatures and governments is an embedded feature of its 
reasoning processes.
122
 While the signs are emerging that a moderated approach is 
emergent at the local level, it has yet to be fully and/or consistently realised. The 
judicial self-denying ordinance which appeared to oppose the accommodation of 
procedural concerns into proportionality analysis under section 6 HRA has shown 
itself to be more flexible than initially presumed. This is to be contrasted with the 
rather more immoveable constitutional obstacle which, in the context of statutory 
review, precludes full judicial engagement with the content of legislative process. In 
the light of these parallel developments, it should be recognised that the examination 
of administrative and legislative decision-making processes by the domestic judiciary 
can be facilitative of subsidiarity and can serve to support a finding by the Strasbourg 
Court that a potential infringement of the Convention rights falls within the 
disrectionary area of judgment afforded to national authorities. For so long as 
domestic courts lack the willingness or competence to fully consider the adequacy of 
administrative or legislative decision-making processes in their assessments of 
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proportionality, an opportunity to fully benefit from the Convention’s new ‘age of 
subsidiarity’123 will remain tantalisingly out of reach.  
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